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The  economic  approach  to  the  study  of  human  behavior  has  been  presented  by  its 
foremost representative as the most effective method of studying social phenomena. Gary 
Becker’s view supposes that, on the one hand, all social phenomena can be explained as 
a  consequence  of  individual  actions  and,  on  the  other,  there  is  a  stable  pattern  of 
individual behavior economics has been able to understand thoroughly. 
Hence, economics, according to this view, is no longer limited to the study of a certain 
domain  of human  actions  or to  the  understanding  of material  wealth  or  the  necessary 
conditions for the material reproduction of society. Economics is a method that gives the 
social  scientist  the  necessary  tools  to  understand  and  even  transform  the  world  that 
surrounds him/her.  
Becker clearly acknowledges the direct link between his approach and Jeremy Bentham’s 
theory.  Beyond  the  apparent  connections  regarding  their  conception  of  human  nature 
there is one central point that links the two authors: their view of economics as an attitude 
of the human mind, an inherent capacity to calculate that explains all human actions. This 
paper argues that Bentham provides the philosophical groundings for Becker’s theory. The 
application of the principle of utility to every aspect of human behavior justifies economic 
imperialism  by  transforming  economics  into  a  method  of  general  analysis  of  human 
behavior.  Indeed,  economics  is  no  longer  defined  according  to  its  subject  matter  but 
according to its method, which means an increasing scope explaining Becker’s claim that 
the  economic  approach  provides  a  rigorous  framework  for  the  analysis  of  all  social 
phenomena. 
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LAS BASES UTILITARISTAS DE LA APROXIMACIÓN ECONÓMICA 







La aproximación económica al comportamiento humano ha sido presentada por su 
máximo representante como el método más efectivo de estudiar los fenómenos 
sociales. La visión de Gary Becker supone que, por un lado, todos los fenómenos 
sociales pueden ser explicados como consecuencias de las acciones individuales 
y, por otro, existe un patrón estable del comportamiento humano que la economía 
ha sido capaz de entender a cabalidad. 
Por lo tanto, la economía según esta posición ya no se limita al estudio de los 
fenómenos  de  mercado  ó  a  la  comprensión  de  la  riqueza  material  o  de  las 
condiciones necesarias para la reproducción material de la sociedad. La economía 
es  un  método  que  brinda  al  científico  social  las  herramientas  necesarias  par 
entender e incluso transformar la realidad que le rodea.  
Becker reconoce explícitamente el vínculo directo entre su aproximación y la teoría 
de  Jeremy  Bentham.  Más  allá  de  las  conexiones  aparentes  en  cuanto  a  su 
concepción de la naturaleza humana, existe un punto central que liga a los dos 
autores: su visión de la economía como una aptitud de la mente humana, una 
capacidad inherente de calcular que explica todas las acciones  humanas. Este 
texto busca mostrar que Bentham ofrece los fundamentos filosóficos de la teoría 
de  Becker.  La  aplicación  del  principio  de  la  utilidad  a  todos  los  aspectos  del 
comportamiento humano justifica el imperialismo económico porque transforma la 
economía  en  un  método  general  de  análisis  de  ese  comportamiento.  En 
consecuencia, la economía deja de ser un área de estudio y se convierte en una 
metodología, lo cual implica incrementar su campo de aplicación. Esto explica la 
afirmación de Becker según la cual la aproximación económica ofrece un marco 
riguroso para el análisis de todos los fenómenos sociales.  
 
Palabras clave: Gary Becker, Jeremy Bentham, imperialismo económico, principio 
de utilidad. 
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1.  Introduction 
Economic imperialism is not a new phenomenon. The Physiocrats, for one, 
considered  their  nouvelle  science  of  economics  as  the  “science  of  natural  law 
applied, as it should be, to civilized society”
1 and, deplored J.B. Say’s restricting 
economics to the science of wealth
2. However, economics was defined according 
to a  particular field. Economics  dealt  with  the  administration  of  government (as 
Smith  said:  a  branch  of  the  science  of  the  legislator)  or  as  the  study  of  the 
production and reproduction of material wealth or, more generally, of the material 
conditions  of  human  life.  This  definition  of  economics  limited  its  scope  and 
economic theory centered its attention on explaining the phenomena of production, 
distribution and consumption.  
This study implied a method. The methodological individualism followed by 
most  economists,  assuming  social phenomena  can be  explained  as  a  result  of 
individual  action,  led  to  concentrate  on  individual  behavior.  Increasingly, 
economists approached their field with certain techniques derived from a particular 
conception  of  human  nature.  The  method  then  consists  in  assuming  a  certain 
axiomatic concerning human behavior from which the topic is analyzed. Economics 
is no longer defined by a particular field but by a particular method. 
Gary Becker, in the introduction to his 1976 book The Economic Approach 
to Human Behavior discusses the different definitions of economics. Significantly in 
exergue to this introduction he quotes George Bernard Shaw: “Economy is the art 
of  making  the  most  of  life.”  After  considering  three  possible  definitions,  Becker 
concludes  L.  Robbins’s  (1932)  definition  is  the  most  general  of  all. Economics, 
according to this definition, corresponds to the study of how human beings allocate 
                                                 
1 Quote in Neill (1949), p.535-6. 
2 Dupont de Nemours (1815, quoted in Ibid., p.536).   4 
scarce resources to competing ends
3. This definition, according to Becker, means 
economics is not limited to the study of market phenomena (Becker 1976, p.4) or 
to what we have called the reproduction of the material conditions of human life. 
This definition then  would  not give much light  as to what makes the difference 
between economics and other social sciences. 
Becker continues asserting this definition, as broad as it might seem, says 
nothing  about  the  economic  approach,  or  what  we  have  called  the  method  of 
economics.  And  it  is  precisely  this  point  that  Becker  considers  to  be  the 
characteristic feature of economics (Ibid, p.5). Economics has a particular method 
of analysis (Becker 1993, p.385) according to which explaining human behavior, on 
the basis of certain assumptions, leads to understand social phenomena. 
When  asked  what  he  understood  when  being  classified  as  an  economic 
imperialist Becker answered: 
“That  refers  to  my  belief  that  economic  analysis  can  be  applied  to  many 
problems  in  social  life,  no  just  those  conventionally  called  ‘economic’.  The 
theme of my Nobel lecture, based on my life’s work, is that the horizons of 
economics  need  to  be  expanded.  Economists  can  talk  not  only  about  the 
demand for cars, but also about matters such as the family, discrimination, and 
religion, and about prejudice, guilt, and love. Yet these areas have traditionally 
received little attention in economics. In that sense, it’s true: I am en economic 
imperialist.  I  believe  good  techniques  have  a  wide  application.”  (Interview 
Becker 1993a). 
 
                                                 
3 Robbins considers “the unity of subject of Economic Science [is] the forms assumed by human 
behaviour in disposing of scarce means”, (1994 [1932], p.85). “Economics is the science which 
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative 
uses” (in a footnote to this sentence Robbins refers to Menger, Mises, Fetter, Strigl and Mayer) 
(Ibid.).   5 
Becker has been praised and criticized because of this presumption within 
and outside economics. He has been praised for opening new research fields in 
economics and has been followed by an ever increasing number of economists 
(Rosen 1993). This is the case in the field of Law and Economics where William 
Landes  and Richard  Posner have become prominent figures and recognize the 
importance of Becker’s initial spark. Victor Fuchs (1994) also sees in Becker an 
important sponsor of the field of health  economics. Becker  has  also  had major 
influence  in  the  fields  of  sociology,  political  science  and  demography.  Criticism 
centers mostly on his extensive use of rational choice theory, that is of the rational 
economic agent
4. This criticism goes beyond the appraisal of Becker’s work, it has 
pervaded most of the recent history of economics and constitutes a vast corpus of 
literature  nowadays  following,  for  example,  Sen  (1977)  (cf.  Bowles  and  Gintis 
1993,  2000;  Gintis  2000;  Zafirovski  2003;  Steele  2004,  amongst  many  others). 
Criticism  has  also  been  addressed  to  Becker’s  economic  imperialism,  to  his 
intention of applying a single method as if it were capable of explaining all human 
behavior (Zafirovski 1999, 2000). 
The aim of this paper is not to appraise Becker’s influence on economic 
theory, in particular, or social sciences, in general, or to present a criticism of his 
work. The point we wish to advance lies within the history of economic thought. 
Becker presents his work as a continuation of a long series of authors who have 
used the economic approach to human behavior but who did not have the technical 
instruments in order to make a rigorous and ample use of it. Among these authors, 
Becker gives particular importance to Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. Actually, 
                                                 
44 Becker recognizes economics might have a narrow approach to preferences and behaviour: 
“…we do not have to assume that everybody is a perfect calculator. There are limits to our ability to 
calculate. Broader preferences and ‘bounded’ rationality are part of a more relevant model of 
rational behavior. In my own way I have been trying to broaden preferences to take account of 
some of these points. But I am dubious about behavior that won’t survive in an exchange economy 
with an extensive division of labor.” (Clement, Interview, 2002, p.22).   6 
Adam  Smith,  according  to  Becker,  is  less  systematic  in  his  application  of  the 
economic approach than Bentham. Bentham, on the other hand, was much too 
worried with social reform and the normative aspects of his theory to exploit all of 
the economic approach’s implications.  
However, following Force (2003), we will argue that Bentham provides the 
philosophical  groundings  for  Becker’s  theory.  It  is  in  the  understanding  of  the 
contents and status of the principle of utility that we might grasp the foundations 
and consequences of the conception of human nature implied by the economic 
approach. Force (2003, p.93) considers that “the reference to Bentham indicates 
that  Becker’s  theory  remains  indebted  to  eighteenth-century  neo-Epicureanism” 
and believes that “Becker shares with philosophers like Bentham and Helvétius 
(…) the desire to identify some stable principle of behavior behind the bewildering 
variety of human choices and preferences”.  
We  take  a  step  further  than  Force  in  arguing  that  the  application  of  the 
principle of utility to every aspect of human behavior justifies economic imperialism 
by transforming economics into a method of general analysis of human behavior. 
Indeed,  economics  is  no  longer  defined  according  to  its  subject  matter  but 
according  to its method,  which means  an  increasing scope  explaining  Becker’s 
claim that the economic approach provides a rigorous framework for the analysis of 
all social phenomena. 
The paper is divided in five sections including this introduction. The second 
section  presents  Becker’s  economic  approach  to  human  behavior  and  the 
implications of this approach on the relations between economics and sociology 
and economics and psychology. In section 3 we explore the connection between 
Bentham  and  Becker.  Becker  explicitly  recognizes  Bentham  as  one  of  the 
ancestors of the economic approach but considers this connection has mostly to   7 
do with the analysis of law and economics. In this section we will try to show this 
connection goes beyond this field. Bentham’s principle of utility would not only be 
the  foundation  of  his  social  reform  project  but  also  the  basis  for  the  economic 
approach to  human  behavior.  Section  4 attempts  at  showing  how  this principle 
constitutes the grounds for the transformation of economics from a field of study 
into a method of analysis. In the final section we present some concluding remarks 
and questions that are left open in our analysis; in particular, the relation between 
Bentham’s hedonistic psychology and the theory of utility.   
 
2.  The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 
The interest of the economic approach to human behavior is, according to 
its  tenants,  it  is  the  most  general  and  powerful  approach  available  in  social 
sciences (Stigler and Becker 1977, p.77). In Becker’s words “The rational choice 
model provides the most promising basis presently available for a unified approach 
to  the  analysis  of  the  social  world  by  scholars  from  different  social  sciences” 
(Becker  1993a,  p.403).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Becker  assimilates  the 
economic  approach  to  the  rational  choice  model,  which  indicates  all  his 
construction relies on a specific conception of human nature underlying a unified 
idea of human behavior
5. This is why, according to the author:  
“[T]he economic approach provides a valuable framework for understanding all 
human  behavior”  because  “all  human  behavior  can  be  viewed  as  involving 
participants  who maximize  their  utility  from  a stable  set  of  preferences  and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
markets” (Becker 1976, p.14). 
                                                 
5 We will come back to this point in section 3.   8 
The economic approach has become very influential not only in economics 
but  also  in  other  social  sciences.  Becker  was  awarded  the  Nobel  Prize  in 
Economics in 1992 for "having extended the domain of economic theory to aspects 
of human behavior which had previously been dealt with—if at all—by other social 
science  disciplines  such  as  sociology,  demography  and  criminology."  Analyzing 
this success as regards crime, Becker asserts: “One reason  why the economic 
approach to crime became so influential is that the same analytic apparatus can be 
used to study enforcement of all laws, including minimum wage legislation, clean 
air  acts,  insider  trader  and  other  violations  of  security  law,  and  income  tax 
evasions” (Becker 1993a, p.391). More generally, Becker says: 
“I have come to the position that the economic approach is a comprehensive 
one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it behavior involving money 
prices or imputed shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or 
minor decisions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or 
women, adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, 
businessmen  or  politicians,  teachers  or  students.  The  applications  of  the 
economic approach so conceived are as extensive as the scope of economics 
in the definition given earlier [Robbins’s] that emphasizes scarce means and 
competing ends. It is an appropriate approach to go with such a broad and 
unqualified definition, and with the statement by Shaw that begins this essay 
[cf. p.1 of this paper].” (Becker 1976, p.8)  
Becker  believes  this  approach  models  “commonsense”  ideas,  which 
explains why it is so appealing and even familiar to anyone who reads his work. 
Becker  uses  this  approach  to  analyze  four  main  topics:  discrimination  against 
minorities, crime and punishment, human capital and family behavior. In general 
terms, all these topics have to do with the analysis of social interactions, which 
Becker explicitly analyzes in his 1974 article “A Theory of Social Interactions”.    9 
In  this  article  Becker  attempts  to  incorporate  “a  general  treatment  of 
interactions into the modern theory of consumer demand” (Becker 1974, p.1066). 
He advances this general treatment has a large applicability and significance (Ibid.) 
and regrets modern economics has given little attention to a key subject in earlier 
economic thinkers that had been left to sociology and anthropology (Ibid, p.1091). 
The analytical framework he uses is the same as the one he had used in the past 
and will use in the future. 
This framework assumes individuals are utility-maximizers and preferences 
are  stable  over  time  and  similar  among  individuals.  Individuals  are  then 
characterized by their utility functions and the arguments that constitute it. These 
arguments may include tastes for discrimination, altruism among family members, 
advantages from crime, etc., making the analysis applicable to most any aspect of 
human  life.  The  applicability  and  power  of  the  approach  has  been  greatly 
enhanced by what Stigler and Becker (1977, p.77) call the new theory of consumer 
choice. This theory “transforms the family from a passive maximizer of the utility 
from  market  purchases  into  an  active  maximizer  also  engaged  in  extensive 
production and investment activities” (Stigler and Becker 1977, p.77). Households 
then “maximize a utility function of objects of choice, called commodities, that they 
produce with market goods, their own time, their skills, training and other human 
capital,  and  other  inputs”  (Ibid.).  The  arguments  of  the  utility  function  then 
correspond  to  the  commodities  produced  and  the  production  function  varies 
according  to  the  subject  studied  (e.g.  the  characteristics  of  other  persons  with 
whom  the  individual  interacts,  music  appreciation,  education,  medical  care  or 
training).  
The flexibility of the approach is thus evident. Individuals can produce any 
commodity from which they derive pleasure and this goes beyond market activity. 
Besides, economics, as Becker himself acknowledges, has spent a considerable   10 
amount  of  time  in  its  recent  history  to  the  elaboration  and  perfectioning  of 
mathematical formalization and techniques. This allows having a rigorous technical 
framework  to  analyze  optimization  problems.  The  economic  approach  then 
conceives of every social phenomenon as the result of a rational choice made by 
individuals; in other words, as the result of an optimization problem faced by utility 
maximizers
6. 
This means, the economic approach pretends to give a rigorous framework 
to sociology on the basis of certain assumption regarding human behavior. This is 
why in this section we will briefly present the implications of such a view on the 
relations  between  economics  and  sociology  (2.1)  and  between  economics  and 
psychology (2.2). 
 
2 2. .1 1. .    E Ec co on no om mi ic cs s   a an nd d   S So oc ci io ol lo og gy y   
There is a growing corpus of literature in economic sociology resulting from 
active interactions between both disciplines (Krier 1999). Economic sociology is not 
new  and  has  its  origins  in  the  works  of Weber,  Durkheim,  Veblen  and  Pareto. 
However,  an  increasing  divide  between  both  disciplines  led  to  its  decline  that 
prevailed  until  the  1970’s.  The  basic  premise  is  that  social  phenomena  are 
complex and the analysis of many economic phenomena must use sociology. The 
revival of the discipline has been associated precisely with the defense of such a 
view against such economic imperialists as Becker
7 in economics and Coleman
8 in 
                                                 
6 In Mitchell’s terms: “Human nature itself became simple enough to let the economist use the 
powerful methods of analysis provided by mathematics.” (1916, p.143). 
7 Assessing Becker’s influence on sociology, Baron and Hannan (1994, p.1113) report that between 
1970 and 1992 Becker ranks very high in the citation records in sociological reviews. We must not 
forget Becker holds a joint appointment in the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago 
since 1993. 
8 James Coleman appears to be one of the foremost defenders of the application of rational choice 
theory to sociology (Baron and Hannan 1994, p.1114). This sociological version of rational choice, 
according to Zafirovski (2000, p.451), takes four ingredients from rational choice theory:   11 
sociology  (Krier  1999,  p.672;  Zafirovski  1999,  p.588;  Baron  and  Hannan  1994, 
pp.1115-7).  
The justification of the use of rational choice theory in sociology runs along 
very  similar  lines  to  those  Becker  uses:  this  theory  provides  a  rigorous  and 
powerful analytical framework based on simple and effective assumptions (Macy 
1995,  p.73).  It  helps  simplifying  sociological  explanations  that  suffered  from 
overcomplexification of social phenomena (Baron and Hannan 1994, p.1114). In so 
doing,  it  would  make  provide  sociology  with  a  general  and  abstract  theory 
overcoming  its  general  tendency  to  rely  mostly  on  empirical  and  case  by  case 
studies. Sociology, profiting from extended use of mathematics in rational theory, 
would  then  become  a  true  science  (Sorensen  1986).  Becker  has  been  directly 
associated  with  this  process  because  his  analysis  of  discrimination,  crime  and 
family  “has  forced sociologists to  reexamine  their  standard  views,  and in  some 
areas such as fertility research, his approach is becoming dominant” (Fuchs 1994, 
p.191). 
The notion of human capital Becker developed in 1964 has been particularly 
influential in sociology. It has been used to explain social phenomena that imply 
some kind of investment, as is the case for health and education. Extending the 
notion of capital beyond material goods, as Becker does with human capital and 
consumption capital (in his work with Stigler), has led some prominent sociologists 
to view human action as a permanent search for and mobilization of different sorts 
                                                                                                                                                     
“methodological individualism, the principle of actor maximization, the concept of a social optimum, 
and the notion of a system equilibrium”. In the same vein as Becker, Coleman argues that social 
and political action “can be viewed as a generalization of market behavior” (quoted in Zafirovski 
2000, p.452). A detailed analysis of Coleman’s work lies beyond the scope of this paper. In this 
section we only seek to appraise Becker’s influence on the new relationships forged between 
economics and sociology.   12 
of capital. This is the case of Pierre Bourdieu who develops his theory in terms of 
different types of capital (cultural, academic, social, scientific, etc)
9. 
Sociological  rational  choice  theory  has  tried  to  give  new  insights  into 
traditional subjects such as social order or collective action. These phenomena are 
presented as the result of individual decisions produced through the maximization 
of  utility.  This  theory  tends  to  transform  economic  sociology,  in  particular,  and 
sociology,  in  general,  into  a  branch  of  economic  analysis  (as  opposed  to  the 
attempts of the first authors of economic sociology).  
This approach has been the object of severe criticism from within sociology. 
Not only does methodological individualism seem unacceptable but also its close 
link with utilitarianism is considered as highly problematic
10. In Schumpeter’s terms 
when considering the link between economics and utilitarianism:  
“As  regards  ‘classic’  recommendations,  there  are  no  doubt  many  that  are 
wholly neutral with respect to any philosophy of life… But there are others – 
unconditional free trade, for example – that did imply views of general policy 
and attitudes to life that do seem, to say the least, to link up with utilitarianism 
better than with any other philosophy of life. As regards economic sociology, 
utilitarianism can only be described as a complete failure since its rationalistic 
conception  of  individual  behavior  and  social  institutions  was  obviously  and 
radically wrong. But as regards the part of economic analysis which works with 
rational schemata, utilitarian philosophy, though superfluous, does no harm. 
And this fact, as critics would have recognized if they had been competent 
economists,  salvages  the  bulk  of  the  work  in  economic  analysis  done  by 
utilitarians.” (Schumpeter 1967 [1954], p.409, our italics). 
                                                 
9 For an interesting analysis of Bourdieu’s work as an application of economics to sociology see 
Favereau 2001. This interpretation is highly contested by followers of Bourdieu’s sociology and 
Bourdieu himself would certainly not agree with the idea of his theory being a product of economic 
imperialism. 
10 For a synthesis of these criticisms see Baron and Hannan 1994; Zafirovski 1999, 2000.   13 
The point then is the validity of the assumptions made on human behavior. 
Economic  imperialism  relies  on  a  particular  conception  of  human  behavior  that 
seems to draw heavily on the hedonistic psychology mobilized by utilitarianism. 
 
2 2. .2 2. .    E Ec co on no om mi ic cs s   a an nd d   P Ps sy yc ch ho ol lo og gy y
1 11 1   
Viewing individuals as utility maximizers implies assuming a certain human 
behavior but has no implication as to the object of choice. Davis (2003, p.32) says: 
“there is nothing that commits rational choice analysis to any particular view of the 
nature  or  content  of  preferences,  and  the  door  is  wide  open  to  making  any 
assumptions  about  their  character  that  may  suit  the  investigation  at  hand”. 
According  to  Simon  (1986,  p.210),  the  assumption  of  rational  individuals  in 
economics is free from any assumption as to the contents of human goals and 
values;  it  assumes  human  behavior  is  consistent  over  time  and  is  rationally 
objective as regards the means it mobilizes. Economic rationality has to do with the 
results of decisions and not with the process that leads to those decisions (Ibid).  
Paul Samuelson’s theory of revealed preferences reinforces this stand by 
reducing preferences to a set of behavioral propositions. Economics does not deal 
with formation of these preferences; they are deduced from an individual’s actual 
choices. This means, individuals choose what they want and no change or gap is 
assumed between actual choice and preference orderings.  
                                                 
11 Here we deal only with the relationships between economics and psychology implied by the 
economic approach. We leave aside all the development of economic psychology and behavioral 
economics over the last years, that has been recently recognized with the Nobel Prize given to 
Vernon Smith and Daniel Kahneman in 2002. Smith and Kahneman can be seen as tenants of an 
opposite approach to Becker’s approach to human behavior in that they try to incorporate 
psychological insights into economics coming from experimental economics. Becker has said he 
believes experimental and market behavior may be totally different (Douglas, Interview, 2002, p.22) 
and thus we can presume he doubts experimental economics has much to say on the type of 
behavior he seeks to explain.   14 
The  economic  approach  to  human  behavior  builds  upon  this  view  and 
assumes  tastes  are  given  and  preferences  are  stable:  “Tastes  are  the 
unchallengeable axioms of a man’s behavior… taste neither change capriciously 
nor differ importantly between people.” (Stigler and Becker 1977, 76)
12. Individuals 
rationally  maximize  their  utility  function  or  the  expected  value  of  this  function. 
Nothing  is  said  about  the  actual  process  of  preference  formation.  Individuals 
maximize  utility  as  they  conceive  it.  In  this  sense,  the  economic  approach,  in 
particular,  and  economic  theory,  in  general,  has  tried  to  stay  away  from 
psychology
13 
Lewin  (1996)  traces  this  antipsychological  bias  to  the  crisis  of  hedonism 
near  the  turn  of  the  XXth  century  with  the  debate  about  the  relationship  of 
economics  with  other  social  sciences  (Lewin  1996,  1294).  Hedonism  became 
particularly relevant in economics through the incorporation of benthamite analysis 
into  Jevons’s  economic  theory.  Jevons  underlines  the  importance  of  the  utility 
principle and of benthamite theory as a social philosophy. However, he considers 
economics deals with the lowest level feelings and leaves aside all that has no 
direct  relationship  with  material  wellbeing.  Hence,  Jevons  separates  economics 
from moral theory even if he asserts the first should be grounded on reasonable 
moral foundations (Sigot 2002, 266).  
This  explains  why  Jevons  builds  his  economic  theory  on  the  grounds  of 
Bentham’s felicific calculus. In detail, his theory is built upon pleasures and pains 
and the possibility of quantifying them in order to construct a mathematical science. 
Jevons, following Bentham as we shall see in what follows, gives a central place to 
                                                 
12 This hypothesis has been the object of numerous criticisms from economists as well as 
psychologists (cf. Hirschman 1984; Bowles 1998; Rabin 1998; Elster 1998; Davis 2003). 
13 As noted in footnote 11 this trend is changing in recent years with behavioral economics. This 
branch of economics is becoming highly influential and aims precisely at incorporating 
psychological considerations within economics in order to gain in realism.    15 
individual behavior understood as the individual’s capacity to calculate in terms of 
pleasures  and  pains.  Nevertheless,  Jevons,  because  of  his  concern  of  making 
economics a mathematical science, leaves aside various elements from Bentham’s 
theory. According to Sigot (2001, 149-53), this simplification implies eliminating the 
normative  sense  of  Bentham’s  utilitarianism  thus  its  reformist  intentions  and  its 
central figure: the legislator.  
Economics is no longer a branch of the science of the legislator and besides 
preferences  are  considered  to  be  exogenous,  contrary  to  Bentham’s  theory. 
Indeed, in Bentham’s utilitarianism, individuals are considered as utility maximizers 
(i.e. calculators who try to maximize their pleasures and minimize their pains) who 
act under the direct influence of the legislator or the deontologist. This means that 
these two figures are capable of creating new interests and/or imposing constraints 
on human behavior in order to direct individuals towards the maximization of social 
utility (i.e. the greatest happiness for the greatest number, making duty and interest 
coincide (Bentham 1996 [1789], p.34)). Preferences are then endogenous as the 
deontologist and the legislator are capable of changing not only exterior constraints 
(i.e. imposing dissuasive punishments (Ibid, p.157)) but also of making individuals 
change the arguments of their utility function through information and the use of the 
public sanction (Bentham 1983, p.175, 251). 
In  spite  of  these  changes,  Jevons,  like  Bentham,  sees  utility  as  a  real 
psychological substance and the Bentham’s notion of individuals as hedonists is 
incorporated within economic theory. Jevons’s achievement then would have been 
transforming  economics  into  a  science  using  utility  theory  hence  “making  it 
possible to derive economic laws from a single fundamental law of human nature – 
the law of maximum utility” (Lewin 1996, p.1297).   16 
Towards the end of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth harsh 
criticism was addressed to this hedonistic view of human beings. Psychologists, for 
one, contended there existed other motives than pleasure and pain; behavior could 
often be impulsive and not goal oriented and so a study of human behavior should 
take into account non teleological motives (Ibid., p.1299). Institutionalists, on the 
other hand, also claimed the economic view of human behavior was insufficient 
and  not  only  instincts  but  also  “evolution  of  institutions  and  the  social 
embededness  of  economic  activity”  should  be  considered  (Ibid,  p.1300).  These 
criticisms,  according  to  Lewin  (Ibid.,  p.1305)  were  invigorated  with  the  growing 
influence of behaviorism and positivism. Economics should be able to postulate 
falsifiable  propositions  in  order  to  have  a  truly  scientific  status.  The  hedonistic 
assumptions did not seem to stand to the test.  
Mainstream  economics  was  not  immune  to  these  criticisms.  Hedonistic 
language was increasingly left aside and authors such as Pareto asserted “ordinal 
preferences  did  not  require  any  psychological  interpretation;  they  merely 
summarized empirical regularities of choice behavior” (Ibid., p.1309). Economics’ 
total independence of hedonistic psychology was supposed to be achieved with the 
theory of revealed preferences.  
Nevertheless,  it  is  difficult  not  to  see  at  least  some  remains  of  such 
psychology  in  the  standard  assumptions  on  human  behavior  economic  theory 
uses. Utility might not be directly associated with pleasure or with an ultimate aim 
of individual action but it is difficult not to see human behavior is conceived as 
having  an  aim,  as  acting  in  a  teleological  fashion,  which  allows  maximizing  an 
object of choice normally thought as producing some kind of satisfaction.  
The decline of behaviorism and the impossibility of empirically founding the 
theory of revealed preferences, led to a revival of utility theory as such justified   17 
through  Friedman’s  “as  if”  methodology.  Microeconomic  theory  broadened  its 
scope  and  was  used  to  analyze  non  market  phenomena.  In  this  context,  the 
economic  approach  to  human  behavior  found  fertile  grounds.  In  a  sense,  this 
approach is a revival of utility theory as conceived by its first tenants thus a return 
to Bentham’s utilitarianism even if economics claims to be value free. 
 
3.  From Bentham to Becker: Beyond Law and Economics 
Becker believes that if the basic assumption regarding individual behavior 
are  correct  then  “the  economic  approach  provides  a  unified  framework  for 
understanding  behavior  that  has  long  been  sought  by  and  eluded  Bentham, 
Comte, Marx, and others.” (Becker 1976, p.14). In this section we will present the 
connection between the economic approach and, at least, the second sense of the 
Bentham’s  principle  of  utility.  In  so  doing,  we  strive  at  showing  that  Becker’s 
endeavors can be seen as the direct application of Bentham’s methodology, which 
goes beyond the latter’s concern with legal and illegal activities. The underlying 
hypothesis is that Bentham can be considered as the true founder of the economic 
approach
14 and, therefore, of this particular form of economic imperialism. 
 
3 3. .1 1. .    T Th he e   O Ob bv vi io ou us s   R Re el la at ti io on ns sh hi ip p   
Becker recognizes his work is the accomplishment of the initial attempts of 
Beccaria and Bentham to apply economic calculus to criminology thus providing an 
economic theory of punishment: 
                                                 
14 Becker considers Adam Smith to be the first tenant of the economic approach to human behavior 
(Becker 1976, p.12). However, he acknowledges Smith did not systematically apply the approach 
(Ibid). It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this point but the vast recent literature on 
Smith seems to nuance if not refute Becker’s allegation.   18 
“Lest  the  reader  be  repelled  by  the  apparent  novelty  of  an  ‘economic’ 
framework for illegal behavior, let him recall that two important contributors to 
criminology  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  Beccaria  and 
Bentham,  explicitly  applied  economic  calculus.  Unfortunately,  such  an 
approach has lost favor during the last hundred years, and my efforts can be 
viewed as a resurrection, modernization, and thereby I hope improvement on 
these much earlier pioneering studies.” (Becker 1968, 209)
15. 
The framework is, obviously, the same Becker uses to analyze other social 
phenomena. Self-interested individuals strive at maximizing their utility, minimizing 
their costs, in an environment characterized by scarcity, uncertainty and conflicting 
goals (Guidi 2000, p.4). Bentham is considered as a forerunner because of the 
welfarist and consequentialist features of his theory (Ibid., p.5).  
Bentham did not intend to limit his theory only to the analysis of the law or 
the  system  of legislation.  He  believed  the  utility  principle could  be  used as the 
basis for the analysis of all social activity because it was built on the fact that the 
two sovereign masters of humanity are pain and pleasure (Bentham 1996[1789], 
p.11). 
“By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves 
of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have 
to  augment  or  diminish  the  happiness  of  the  party  whose  interest  is  in 
question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or oppose that 
happiness.” (Bentham 1996[1789], p.12).  
The  principle  of  utility  is  a  standard  of  evaluation.  It  is  evidently 
consequentialist: actions producing pleasure are good as long as the pain or the 
                                                 
15 “I explored instead the theoretical and empirical implications of the assumption that criminal 
behavior is rational (see the early pioneering work by Bentham [1931] and Beccaria [(1797) 1986].” 
(Becker 1993a, p.390). The texts Becker refers to are: Beccaria On Crimes and Punishments and 
Bentham Theory of Legislation.   19 
sum of pains it might produce is less than the total sum of pleasures (Bentham 
1983, p.150). And it is not restricted to the actions of a single human being but of 
any “party” be it one individual or a whole community.  
The  principle  supposes  a  particular  view  of  human  behavior.  Individuals 
strive  at  maximizing  their  pleasure  and  their  motive  of  action  is  precisely  this 
maximization. This implies calculus naturally finds its way into the analysis of social 
phenomena. Bentham explicitly states human beings calculate: 
“When matters  of such importance  as  pain and  pleasure  are  at  stake,  and 
these  in  the  highest  degree  (the  only  matters,  in  short,  that  can  be  of 
importance) who is there that does not calculate? Men calculate, some with 
less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men calculate. I would not say, 
that even a madman does not calculate. Passion calculates, more or less, in 
every  man:  in  different  men,  according  to  the  warmth  or  coolness  of  their 
disposition; according to the firmness or irritability of their minds; according to 
the nature of their motives by which they are acted upon” (Ibid., p.173-4). 
This  is  true  of  anyone  and  in  any  circumstance.  Hence,  Bentham’s 
utilitarianism is not restricted to law. On the contrary, even in his economic writings 
the  pervasiveness  of  the  utility  principle  is  evident.  Bentham’s  economics  has 
received far  less  attention  than  his legislative and  moral  theories.  However,  an 
increasing  body  of  literature  deals  with  his  economics  as  an  extension  of  his 
utilitarian theory (cf. Sigot 2001, Guidi 2000
16).  
                                                 
16 These two scholars have many more texts on this point and other commentators have also 
contributed to the analysis of Bentham’s economics. Here, we restrict our references to these two 
because they are the most relevant for our present purposes. We must also note that, contrary to 
Sigot’s conclusion (2001, p.188) we do not believe Bentham’s utilitarianism has not been followed 
in economic theory, the whole point of this paper is to show Becker’s theory can be considered as 
the modern representative of Bentham’s ideas even if the censorial sense of the utility principle 
seems to be overlooked.    20 
The point we would like to underline here is that in his economic writings, 
which appear to be punctual analyses of particular problems (i.e. usury, money, 
value) leading to specific policy recommendations, Bentham introduces something 
that belongs to his utilitarianism. The application of the principle of utility implies a 
particular  conception  of  human  behavior.  In  so  doing,  Bentham  introduces  this 
conception  into  economics  and  erases  all  borders  between  different  social 
activities. The study of social phenomena relies on the study of human behavior, 
thus of choices derived from calculations.  
Therefore, as Becker also recognizes, his connection with Bentham goes 
beyond the field of law and economics. In arguing that the economic approach is 
not  new,  Becker  quotes  Bentham  and  his  explicit  belief  “that  the  pleasure-pain 
calculus is applicable to all human behavior” (Becker 1976, p.8). This corresponds 
exactly to what Bentham had already done almost two centuries before.  
 
3 3. .2 2. .    T Th he e   F Fo ou un nd da at ti io on ns s   o of f   B Be en nt th ha am m’ ’s s   P Pr ro oj je ec ct t: :   t th he e   P Pr ri in nc ci ip pl le e   o of f   U Ut ti il li it ty y   
As  we  said  in  the  last  section,  Bentham  builds  his  entire  project  on  the 
grounds of the principle of utility. This principle has two senses: “1. In its censorial 
sense,  it  holds  up  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number  as  the  only 
universally desirable end. 2. In its enunciative sense, each man’s own happiness 
his only actual end.” (Bentham 1983 [1817], p.59-60). Hence, the principle of utility 
is normative and  descriptive. It establishes a higher goal for human action  and 
describes the motives of this action: “Well-being, composed as hath been seen, of 
the maximum of pleasure minus the minimum of pain – the pleasure it will be seen 
is man’s own pleasure; the pain is man’s own pain – will upon strict and close 
enquiry be seen to be actually the intrinsic and the ultimate object of pursuit to 
every man at all times” (Bentham 1983, p.147-8).   21 
Human beings act pursuing their wellbeing or their own interest (Bentham 
1996 [1789], p.74), as they understand it. Indeed, Bentham considers no motive, 
no pleasure or pain, can be called good or evil per se and believes there is no such 
thing  as  a  summum  bonum.  Therefore,  individuals  are  seen  as  having  valid 
reasons to consider a particular object - in the largest sense of the word – as a 
source  of  pleasure  or  pain.  Thus,  just  as  in  the  economic  approach,  after 
individuals define what these objects are they rationally strive to pursue the best 
action in order to obtain the maximum utility seen as the net sum of pleasures.  
The second sense of the principle of utility posits a certain conception of 
human  nature.  This  conception  is  quite  similar  to  the  one  behind  Becker’s 
economic  approach:  “we  are  proposing  the  hypothesis  that  widespread  and/or 
persistent human behavior can be explained by a generalized calculus of utility-
maximizing  behavior,  without  introducing  the  qualification  ‘tastes  remaining  the 
same’. It is a thesis that does not permit of direct proof because it is an assertion 
about the world, not a proposition in logic” (Stigler and Becker 1977, p.76).  
This latter point is strikingly similar to the axiomatic character Bentham gives 
to the principle of utility. Bentham does not discuss this principle: it does not allow 
proof because it is a first principle used to prove everything else (Bentham 1996 
[1789], p.13)
17. This means that, as in Becker, there is no explanation as to why 
they conceive human beings as utility maximizers. Thus, in Halévy’s terms, the 
axiomatic  character  given  to  the  enunciative  sense  of  the  utility  principle 
corresponds to saying 
“that every man unconsciously refers to the principle of utility; it means every 
man considers his utility as a quantity, pleasures and pains as vectors to which 
                                                 
17 “Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every 
thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. 
To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.” (Bentham 1996[1789], p.13).   22 
arithmetical operations can be applied, and the ends of human action as a 
possible object of science” (Halévy 1995 [1901], I p.39, our translation). 
There  is  a  precise  conception  of  human  nature  behind  this  enunciative 
sense  of  the  principle  of  utility.  Mitchell  (1918,  p.172-6)  synthesizes  it  in  the 
following features: 1. human beings are hedonistic; 2. human beings are rational; 
3. human beings are passive; 4. human beings’ only faults are calculation errors; 5. 
human beings have a preference for their own selves.  
Conceiving households as producers of commodities which, in turn, allow 
maximizing utility may seem far from Bentham’s enunciative sense of the utility 
principle. But the characteristics of human nature implied by it are certainly very 
close to those implied by the economic approach to human behavior. Households 
as producers of commodities corresponds to a technically more advanced notion of 
human beings as pleasure producing machines that follow a predetermined guide 
of  action.  That  is,  human  beings  respond  to  a  mechanic  of  passions  and  their 
interactions correspond to the positive and negative externalities they generate on 
each other as a result of the maximization of their own utility.  
Furthermore,  as  Force  (2003,  p.95)  points  out,  “Becker  sees  Bentham’s 
system as an anticipation of his own because it postulated objects of choice that 
were  abstract  entities,  removed  from  empirical  observation”.  In  his  listing  of 
pleasures  and  pains  Bentham  includes  those  of  taste,  sexual  appetite,  senses, 
wealth,  power,  influence  and  authority,  curiosity,  amity,  reputation,  sympathy, 
antipathy, self-regarding and the pains of labor, death and bodily pains (Bentham 
1983[1817]). Thus, pleasures and pains are not directly  associated  with market 
goods, they can be seen as products of the individual or the household. From this 
Force  (ibid)  establishes  a  direct  link  between  the  notion  of  utility  used  by  the 
economic approach and the benthamite notion of pleasure. In this sense, Force   23 
continues, Becker “can safely assume that we all want health, prestige, sensual 
pleasure, benevolence or envy in the same degree because of the pleasure these 
goods bring us.”  
The enunciative sense of the principle of utility then appears to be present in 
the economic approach to human behavior. It is this sense, we have argued, that 
allows  making  the  economic  approach  a  plausible  explanation  of  all  human 
behavior. It is in this sense that we submit Becker is the modern representative of 
Bentham’s  system  and  accomplishes  Bentham’s  wish  of  proposing  a 
comprehensive  method  of  analysis  thus  founding  economics’  pretension  of 
becoming a social philosophy. 
 
4.  Economics as a Method 
Bentham’s explicit treatment of political economy assumes it is a branch of 
legislation. Political economy corresponds to the efficient administration of national 
wealth following the principle of utility. This means, the aim of political economy, as 
that of any other branch of legislation, is to determine when the government must 
intervene in order to guarantee the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In 
economics, this implies that given that government is an evil in itself because it 
constraints  human  liberty,  government  intervention  should  be  reduced  to  its 
minimum and follow a case by case study. Political economy then has to do with 
specific  problems,  the  study  of  which  must  lead  to  specific  policy 
recommendations.  
Even  if  Bentham  seems  to give  a definition  of  economics in  terms  of its 
subject  matter,  as  we  have  already  argued,  it  corresponds  to  a  systematic 
application of the principle of utility. This methodology aims at guaranteeing in the 
economic  sphere,  as  in  any  other  sphere  of  human  action,  the  compatibility   24 
between the enunciative and the censorial sense of the principle of utility. In the 
economic  sphere  this  compatibility  means  solving  the  problems  arising  from 
insufficient information or externalities. 
Therefore,  the  possibility  of  applying  economic  calculus,  pleasure  –  pain 
calculus, to explain all human behavior and therefore social phenomena leads to 
define  economics  as  a  method  rather  than  as  field  of  study.  Economics 
corresponds then to an attitude of the human mind, to a natural disposition towards 
calculation  (e.g.  “all  passions  calculate”).  Therefore,  economics  becomes  the 
social science, it becomes a social philosophy explaining all social phenomena, 
political, cultural, sociological and even moral. 
A major implication of this definition of economics is, as McCloskey (1998) 
calls it, its  ethical  nihilism.    McCloskey traces  this ethical nihilism “to  Bentham, 
viewed as a hero by recent ethical nihilists such as George Stigler, Gary Becker or 
Judge Richard Posner” (1998, p.305). When every motive of action is reduced to 
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, then the criteria of right and wrong, of 
good or bad, is reduced to a correct calculus of utility. Morals becomes a technical 
problem and moral fault becomes a miscalculation. Thus, through Bentham and 
Becker, economics as a method rather than becoming independent from morals 
absorbs  it.  All  virtues  are  reduced  to  the  ability  to  calculate  (which  McCloskey 
identifies with Prudence (1998, p.314). 
This  is  possible  because  of  the  conception  of  human  being  and  human 
action  underlying  Bentham’s  and  Becker’s  theories.  Bentham’s  anthropological 
conception can be seen then as the foundation of the rational economic agent. In 
his economic writings, even if there is no systematic study of human  behavior, 
Bentham builds his analysis upon this figure. In this sense, Bentham appears as 
the  direct  ancestor  of  the  economic  approach.  Guidi  (1997,  3)  remarks  that   25 
“Bentham’s methodology of analysis – based on the deliberations of ‘calculative’ 
individuals who maximize their ‘profit’ under constraints – makes of his ‘economic 
approach to politics’ more than an anticipation of the modern economic analysis of 
(private and public) institutions” and, we would add, of all social phenomena. 
In spite of the points we have strived to show are common to both authors, 
important differences remain. The first and most obvious is the goal each author 
proposes: Bentham aims at social reform whereas Becker seeks to explain social 
phenomena.  Bentham  did  all  he  could  to  implement  his  projects  (e.g.  the 
panopticon prison or the chresthomatic school) and constantly wrote to politicians 
even if they had not asked for his advice. Becker “has not played any significant 
role in the policy arena, either as an advisor to political candidates or in a position 
in government” (Fuchs 1994, p.191). Bentham’s study was intended to show that in 
order  to  reach  the  greatest  happiness  it  was  necessary  to  influence  human 
conduct:  “And  as  the  only  means  by  which  any  individual  can  be  engaged  to 
operate toward it [the greatest happiness], the happiness of that same individual: 
viz. either by indicating or creating an interest operating upon him as a motive and 
engaging him to operate towards that end” (Bentham 1983 [1817], p.60). Becker 
does  not  explicitly  advocate  any  such  end.  In  his  treatment  of  crime  or 
discrimination  he  does  advance  policy recommendations  (e.g. augmenting fines 
rather than imprisonment periods) but he does not see them as a means towards 
greatest happiness. Becker’s justification reads in terms of economic efficiency
18: 
crime  should  be  controlled  because  it  produces  diseconomies  (Becker  1968, 
p.173).  
The  difference,  as  noted  by  Becker  himself,  is  that  Bentham  was  more 
concerned with what individuals ought to do rather than with what they actually do: 
                                                 
18 “The main contribution of this essay, as I see it, is to demonstrate that optimal policies to combat 
illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources” (Becker 1968, p.209).   26 
“he [Bentham] was first and foremost a reformer – and did not develop a theory of 
actual human behavior with many testable implications.” (Becker 1976, p.9). Guidi 
(2000, p.5) remarks that Bentham’s utilitarian approach “examines the whole field 
of legislation in the light of an ethical standard, whereas [economic analysis] rejects 
valuational implications”. This, as noted earlier in this section, may be contested on 
the basis of the consequences of introducing the enunciative sense of the utility 
principle within the economic approach. 
There  is  however  one  point  on  which  both  analyses  agree  concerning 
applied economics (as a social philosophy): a system of punishments and rewards 
is  the  most  effective  way  of  influencing  individual  behavior.  Therefore, 
understanding  human  behavior  is  the  first  step  towards  effective  policy-making 
regardless of the final end. In this sense and in benthamite terms, Becker applies 
the second sense of the principle of utility and considers its consequences in terms 
of social phenomena. Even if, according to Becker, Bentham “did not maintain the 
assumption of stable preferences” he did believe that only through application of 
the principle of utility was it possible to understand society. 
A second difference seems to be more problematic and deserves further 
study. As has been shown in section 2.2, the relationship between utility theory and 
hedonistic  psychology  is  not  straightforward.  Many  economists  since  Alfred 
Marshall have argued economic theory has nothing to do with such a psychology 
or with utilitarianism at large.  
“To be a utility maximizer is merely to choose the available option one most 
prefers  (or,  in  the  case  of ties, to  choose  one  among the  set  of maximally 
preferred  options).  Although  the  utility  language  was  inherited  from  the 
utilitarians,  some  of  whom  thought  of  utility  as  a  sensation  with  a  certain 
intensity, duration, purity or propinquity (Jeremy Bentham 1789, ch. 4) there is 
no such implication in contemporary theory. To speak of individuals as aiming   27 
to maximize utility or as seeking more utility may suggest misleadingly that 
utility is an object of choice, some ultimately good thing that people want in 
addition to healthy children or better television. But the theory of rational choice 
specifies no distinctive aims. This fact is of considerable importance to moral 
theory, for utility theory as such is detached from any hedonistic psychology.” 
(Hausman and McPherson 1993, p.680). 
However,  we  have  tried  to  argue  that,  at  least,  in  the  sense  that  the 
economic approach understands utility in can be closely related to the hedonistic 
psychology  underlying  Bentham’s  utilitarianism.  This  would  lead  to  a  further 
analysis of the theoretical and epistemological implications of reintroducing a moral 
philosophy within economic analysis.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Bentham  defines  individuals  as  beings  capable  of  feeling  pleasures  and 
pains,  whose  behavior  is  governed  by  his/her  self-interest,  his/her  egoistic  and 
sympathetic  passions.  Furthermore,  the  individual  calculates  precisely  because 
he/she is governed by his/her passions. This calculating individual is the foundation 
of  a  pragmatic  philosophy  that  makes  every  aspect  of  human  life  a  technical 
problem. To the extent that this view can be considered as the foundation of the 
economic  approach  to  human  behavior,  Becker  can  be  seen  as  the  modern 
representative of this pragmatic philosophy.  
Bentham thus gives a philosophical justification to the economic approach to 
human behavior. Through the enunciative sense of the principle of utility, Bentham 
gives a new foundation to all human behavior: calculus, utility maximization. We 
have argued that this attitude of the mind to calculate gives a particular definition of 
economics;  this  definition  then  leads  to  assert  that  Bentham’s  pragmatic   28 
philosophy absorbs all the spheres of human action thus legitimizing the economic 
approach to human behavior not on technical but on philosophical grounds. 
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